Excessive Attachments as Abuse of Process in California by Findlay, Charles R.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 9 | Number 1 Article 6
1-1-1969
Excessive Attachments as Abuse of Process in
California
Charles R. Findlay
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Charles R. Findlay, Comment, Excessive Attachments as Abuse of Process in California, 9 Santa Clara Lawyer 132 (1969).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/6
EXCESSIVE ATTACHMENTS AS ABUSE OF
PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA
California now recognizes that an excessive attachment' is an
abuse of process2 rather than malicious prosecution.3 Before an
action for malicious prosecution can be brought, the attachment
action4 complained of must have terminated.5 A cause of action for
abuse of process, however, arises immediately upon levy of attach-
ment and can be brought by cross-claim8 in the attachment suit.7
This comment explores the pleading aspects of treating an ex-
cessive attachment as an abuse of process with particular attention
focused on a potential problem in the classification of the cross-claim
as either a counterclaim or a cross-complaint. The interrelationship
between an award of damages for abuse of process and a recovery
from the sureties on an attachment undertaking is also examined.
An attempt is also made to evaluate the practical desirability of
allowing the pursuit of an abuse of process cross-claim in the same
suit with the underlying action.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION OR ABUSE OF PROCESS?
In the past, actions arising out of excessive attachments have
been considered as claims for malicious prosecution in California,
8
and recovery has been allowed despite the absence of one or more of
the commonly stated elements of malicious prosecution.9 The ele-
1 For the purpose of this comment the following definition of excessive attach-
ment has been employed: An excessive attachment is an attachment, for an ulterior
purpose, of property in an amount greatly exceeding that required to satisfy the
judgment expected. This definition employs the elements stated as essential to abuse
of process expressed in terms specifically applicable to attachments. See note 2 infra.
2 "The essential elements of abuse of process . . . have been stated to be: first,
an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of that process not proper in
the regular conduct of the proceeding." W. PROSSER, TORTS 877 (3d ed. 1964).
3 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 352, 438 P.2d 345, 348, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1968).
4 The term "attachment action" is used throughout this comment to identify the
original action in which the attachment was levied. The plaintiff in the underlying
action is referred to as the "attachment plaintiff" and the defendant in the underlying
action is referred to as the "attachment defendant."
5 Smith v. Hill, 237 Cal. App. 2d 374, 386, 47 Cal. Rptr. 49, 57 (1965).
6 The term cross-claim is used in this comment to refer to either a counterclaim
authorized by CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 437(2) (West 1954) or a cross-complaint
authorized by CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 442 (West 1954).
7 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 358-62, 438 P.2d 345, 351-54, 66
Cal. Rptr. 697, 703-06 (1968).
8 Clark v. Nordholt, 121 Cal. 26, 53 P. 400 (1898) ; Weaver v. Page, 6 Cal. 681
(1856).
9 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 358-62, 438 P.2d 345, 351-54, 66
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ments usually listed for the tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) ajudicial proceeding terminated in favor of the defendant; (2)
malice; and (3) a lack of probable cause to institute the action.10
However, when the foundation of the action is an excessive attach-
ment, the attachment plaintiff usually has probable cause for bring-
ing the attachment action" and for levying, although in a lesser
amount, an attachment. By including claims of this nature within
the purview of malicious prosecution, the California courts have
implicitly accepted the concept that the excessiveness of the attach-
ment itself is equivalent to a want of probable cause. This policy of
the California courts is directly traceable 2 to the policy statement
set forth in the Massachusetts case of Savage v. Brewer."
It seems to be a well established principle, that if one causes another
to be arrested, and held to bail, for a debt not due, or for more than
is due, and this is done knowingly, an action of the case lies for this
abuse of legal process; for the plaintiff knowing that there is no prob-
able cause, and having no expectation to recover the sum demanded,
is presumed to have acted maliciously. The want of probable cause isdecisive on this point. And whether there be no debt due, or a sum
much less than the sum demanded, and this be known is the same.14
(The court then extended the principle to include attachments.)
Furthermore, when the claim for excessive attachment was as-
serted in a separate action apart from the attachment suit, the Cali-
fornia courts largely ignored the defendant's usual failure to prevail
totally in the underlying action. 5 On the other hand, where the
defendant attempted to assert his claim by way of cross-demand
in the attachment suit itself, the courts avoided confrontation with
the requirement of "successful termination" by striking down those
demands on other grounds. For example, the courts have sustained
demurrers to such pleadings on the basis that a sufficient transac-
tional relationship, then required for both a counterclaim or a cross-
complaint, had not been alleged or established.'
Cal. Rptr. 697, 703-06 (1968) specifically cites two cases as illustrating such recovery:
Harris v. Harter, 79 Cal. App. 190, 247 P. 39 (1926), and Clark v. Nordholt, 121 Cal.
26, 53 P. 400 (1898).
10 Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 149, 114 P.2d 335, 337 (1941).
11 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 358-62, 438 P.2d 345, 351-54, 66
Cal. Rptr. 697, 703-06 (1968).
12 See Clark v. Nordholt, 121 Cal. 26, 53 P. 400 (1898) ; Weaver v. Page, 6 Cal.
681 (1856).
13 33 Mass. 453 (1835).
14 Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added).
15 Clark v. Nordholt, 121 Cal. 26, 53 P. 400 (1898).
16 Jeffreys v. Hancock, 57 Cal. 646 (1881). The action for damages from exces-
sive attachment in the same suit was not allowed because not qualified as a cross-
complaint or as a counterclaim under then existing rules which required a transactional
relationship. The opinion did not indicate whether the court would have found a
cause of action stated without prior termination of the attachment suit.
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Recognizing that claims based on excessive attachments fit
poorly, if at all, the elements recognized as essential to malicious
prosecution, the California Supreme Court, in White Lighting Com-
pany v. Wolfson 17 held that an excessive attachment should be
treated as giving rise to a cause of action for abuse of process rather
than for malicious prosecution. The court further ruled that the
attachment defendant could assert his claim immediately in the
attachment action itself.
WHITE LIGHTING COMPANY V. WOLFSON
White Lighting presented a clear-cut case in which a claim for
allegedly excessive attachments was pleaded as an abuse of process
and recovery was sought by means of a cross-complaint in the at-
tachment action. During the course of the attachment action for re-
covery of commissions advanced in the amount of $850, White Light-
ing levied attachments against property alleged by Wolfson to be
worth more than $19,000. Wolfson alleged that the attachments
were made for the ulterior purpose of coercing him to abandon
other cross-demands against White Lighting. The trial court and the
court of appeal ruled against Wolfson on the pleadings, holding
that his action was one for malicious prosecution and, as such, was
prematurely brought.1 8 The California Supreme Court, however,
decided that an excessive attachment gives rise to a cause of action
for abuse of process rather than for malicious prosecution.
9 The
court further ruled, without specifically identifying the appropriate
pleading to be employed, that such a claim could be brought in the
attachment suit.
20
In the course of its opinion the court analyzed various attach-
ment wrongs and set forth four different categories into which such
wrongs could be sorted: 21 (1) Attachments levied in pursuing an
action which itself constitutes malicious prosecution; (2) use of a
regularly issued attachment for an improper purpose; (3) mali-
ciously procured attachments in properly instituted actions in which
the creditor, however, is not entitled to the writ; and (4) attach-
ments of property either exempt from attachment or possessing
value greatly in excess of the amount of the legitimate claim. The
court observed that the first two categories have been correctly
treated by California courts as giving rise to causes of action for
17 68 A.C. 347, 438 P.2d 345, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968).
18 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 59 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1967), vacated.
19 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 352, 438 P.2d 345, 348, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1968).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 360, 438 P.2d at 352-53, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 704-05 (1968).
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malicious prosecution and abuse of process respectively. 22 The third
category was not specifically discussed but appears to have been
considered as abuse of process along with the fourth category."
In discussing excessive attachments the court declared that the
established practice of calling such an action malicious prosecution
rather than abuse of process employed a misnomer; that courts had
long allowed recovery in spite of failure to establish either lack of
probable cause or termination of the proceeding in the attachment
defendant's favor.24 In supporting its conclusion in favor of the
abuse of process theory, the court was also concerned with a matter
of simple justice. It felt that the victim of an excessive attachment
should not have to await the termination of the attachment action to
seek redress.25
EXCEssIvE ATTACI-IMENT: CROSS-COMPLAINT OR COUNTERCLAIM?
The court in White Lighting ruled that an action resulting from
an excessive attachment could be brought by a cross-claim in the
attachment suit. Nowhere in the opinion is there a definite statement
that the court found a sufficient transactional relationship between
the subject matter of the underlying action and the excessive attach-
ment to qualify the cross-demand as a cross-complaint. 26 Although
discussing a pleading labeled a cross-complaint, the court refers to
"claim ' 27 and "cross-claim".28
The court noted29 that an attempt to claim damages for an
unjustified attachment by means of a cross-claim was defeated in
Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Barnes. ° The Barnes opinion
cited for authority a much earlier case, Jeffreys v. Hancock, 1
which had been decided at a time when a transactional relationship
was required for counterclaims as well as for cross-complaints. The
court in White Lighting pointed out that a transactional relationship




25 Id. at 360, 438 P.2d at 352-53, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 704-05.
26 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 442 (West 1954). To meet the cross-complaint trans-
actional relationship requirement, the cause must relate to or depend on the contract,
transaction, matter, happening or accident upon which the action is brought or affect
the property to which the action relates.
27 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 352, 358, 438 P.2d 345, 348, 351,
352, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, 703, 704 (1968).
28 Id. at 362n.10, 438 P.2d at 354n.10, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 706n.10.
29 Id. at 362n.9, 438 P.2d at 354n.9, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 706n.9.
30 205 Cal. App. 2d 337, 23 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1962).
31 57 Cal. 646 (1881).
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decision and disapproved that decision to the extent it was based
on Jeffreys. Enigmatically, the court further stated: "The 1927
amendment of section 438 eliminated the requirement as to the
'same transaction,' although, of course, that prerequisite presently
remains a requirement under section 4422.32 Code of Civil Proce-
dure, section 442,11 deals, of course, with cross-complaints. Although
the statement of the court is unquestionably accurate, the purpose
for reiterating the transactional relationship requirement for a cross-
complaint is elusive.
Since the content of the pleading, rather than the name at-
tached, determines whether a cross-complaint or counterclaim has
been asserted,34 White Lighting may stand for the proposition that
a cross-claim based on an excessive attachment, however labeled,
will be entertained if it qualifies as a counterclaim. If so, the deci-
sion leaves room for a future challenge to the commencement of an
action through a cross-complaint under circumstances that would
preclude consideration of such a cross-claim as a counterclaim 3 5 This
situation could occur if cross-complainant sought to join a new
party, perhaps an agent of the attachment defendant.
On the other hand, the court did not rule that the transactional
relationship was insufficient to support a cross-complaint. Various
factors may imply the court's approval of treatment of the cross-
claim as a cross-complaint. Each of the factors is indicative; none
are conclusive. First, the pleading was labeled a cross-complaint in
the original action, and the court did not criticize that classification
or suggest that the pleading was actually a counterclaim. Second,
the court explained that recognition of the cross-claim in the same
suit as the underlying action promotes the policy of avoiding circu-
ity and multiplicity of litigation.3 6 Had the court intended to restrict
the cross-demands to pleadings which could qualify as counter-
claims, this explanation would be unnecessary. Third, in his dissent-
ing appellate court opinion, 7 which foreshadowed the supreme court
holding, Justice Herndon expressed some concern as to whether a
sufficient transactional relationship would be found to warrant con-
sideration of the pleading as a cross-complaint. He stated: "I am
uncertain whether or not such cause of action should be considered
32 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 352, 358, 438 P.2d 345, 348, 351,
352, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, 703, 704 (1968) (emphasis added).
33 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 442 (West 1954).
84 Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky, 210 Cal. 428, 434, 292 P. 474, 476 (1930).
85 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 438 (West 1954). New parties cannot be brought into
a suit by means of a counterclaim.
36 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. at 362n.10, 438 P.2d at 354n.10, 66
Cal. Rptr. at 706n.10 (1968).
87 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 59 Cal. Rptr. 598, 601 (1967), vacated.
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one arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint ...
It seems to me that modern concepts might dictate an affirmative
answer.) 38 The court may well have silently accepted Justice Hem-
don's thinking on the matter.
Cross-claim may be a Compulsory Counterclaim.
If a transactional relationship does exist between the underly-
ing action and the excessive attachment cross-claim, the question
whether the cross-claim is a compulsory counterclaim 3 must be con-
sidered. A cross-claim which qualifies as a compulsory counterclaim
must be brought in the same suit as the underlying action or not
at all. The key factor qualifying a cross-demand as a compulsory
counterclaim is that the cause of action arises out of the transaction
alleged to be the foundation of the plaintiff's claim." The trans-
actional relationship dilemma which introduces uncertainty into the
classification of a cross-claim as a cross-complaint recurs when the
claim is considered for classification as a compulsory counterclaim.
The California statute authorizing cross-complaints 41 expresses
the transactional relationship requirement in different and perhaps
more encompassing words than those in the statute requiring that
compulsory counterclaims be set up in the same suit as the under-
lying action.42 If there is a transactional relationship between the
underlying action and the excessive attachment sufficient to sup-
port a cross-complaint, there remains the open question whether
a greater degree of relationship will be required to establish a com-
pulsory counterclaim and bar a subsequent action in a separate suit.
But the problem of classification of the cross-claim as a com-
pulsory counterclaim is diminished in significance by the operation
of the statute of limitations. An action for abuse of process is for
injury to the person43 and must be brought within one year of the
date the cause of action accrues. 4 Since a cause of action accrues
when a remedy is available45 and since, under White Lighting, a
38 Id.
39 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 439 (West 1954).
40 Id.
41 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 442 (West 1954).
42 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 439 (West 1954) requires a counterclaim be set up
when the cause arises out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the founda-
tion of the plaintiff's claim. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 442 (West 1954) allows a cross-
complaint when the cause relates to or depends upon the contract, transaction, matter,
happening or accident upon which the action is brought or affects the property to
which the action relates.
43 Simons v. Edouarde, 98 Cal. App. 2d 826, 828, 221 P.2d 203, 204 (1950).
44 CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 340(3) (West 1954).
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remedy is available immediately,4" the statute of limitations starts
to run at the time the property is attached. Therefore, even if a
subsequent action for an excessive attachment is not barred by
virtue of being a compulsory counterclaim, in most instances the
statute will have run and the suit will be barred nonetheless.
ExcESSIVE ATTACHMENT AND THE ATTACHMENT UNDERTAKING
Before levying an attachment a plaintiff must file an undertak-
ing, with sureties, to the effect that, should the plaintiff not be en-
titled to the attachment, or should the defendant prevail in the
action, the plaintiff will pay all costs and damages sustained by
the defendant not exceeding the sum specified in the undertaking. 7
The sum prescribed for the undertaking is basically one-half of the
principal amount specified in the attachment writ although the court
may, within limits, increase or decrease the amount.48 Should the
unsuccessful attachment plaintiff fail to pay the costs and damages
occasioned by the attachment, the prevailing attachment defendant
becomes entitled to proceed directly against the sureties on the
undertaking."
In the typical excessive attachment case the plaintiff prevails,
but in a much smaller amount than claimed.5" In such event, the
attachment undertaking is of no benefit to the defendant, and a
judgment for abuse of process is collectible solely from the plaintiff.
In the less typical situation, the attachment defendant prevails both
in, a cross-claim for abuse of process and in the underlying action.
Such a situation introduces complications. The remainder of this
discussion concerning the attachment undertaking assumes this latter
situation.
To the extent of the undertaking, the sureties can be held
liable for payment of compensatory damages awarded in the abuse
of process judgment to the prevailing defendant.5 ' The statute re-
quiring attachment undertakings provides for payment of "all dam-
ages" caused by the attachment up to the limit of the undertak-
ing. An excessive attachment could not have occurred without an
45 Irvine v. Bossen, 25 Cal. 2d 652, 658, 155 P.2d 9, 13 (1944).
46 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 352, 438 P.2d 345, 348, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1968).
47 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 539 (West 1954).
48 Id.
49 Finn v. Witherbee, 126 Cal. App. 2d 45, 49, 271 P.2d 606, 609 (1954).
50 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 361, 438 P.2d 345, 354, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 706 (1968).
51 Carter v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 266 A.C.A. 886, 72 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1968).
52 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 539 (West 1954).
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attachment having been levied at all, so damages resulting from
the excessive attachment are reasonably considered as caused by
the existence of the attachment itself. Since the amount of the at-
tachment undertaking is determined in relation to the excessive
total amount of the attachment, the measure of potential damages
contemplated under section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure can
thus be assumed to include damages due to the excessiveness of
the attachment.
As a result of a recent decision,53 to the extent the abuse of
process judgment is for punitive damages, it is collectible only from
the attachment plaintiff. The statement had previously been made,
as dictum, that by including the words "all damages" the statute
included punitive damages.54 In disapproving this dictum the court
pointed out that the statute refers to all damages sustained by the
attachment defendant and that punitive damages are not sustained
by the attachment defendant but rather are awarded him to punish
the attachment plaintiff.55
Allowing the attachment defendant to collect his judgment for
abuse of process from the sureties places the sureties in a tenuous
position. The sureties have no more than a contingent interest to
protect at the time the abuse of process cross-claim is filed.
Unless the defendant prevails in the attachment action, the
sureties are subject to no obligation. The sureties thus find them-
selves in the position of having to elect whether to assist the attach-
ment plaintiff in his defense of the abuse of process cross-claim, or
to forego the opportunity to contest the reasonableness of those
damages sought by the attachment defendant.56
However, the basic nature of the undertaking, essentially that
of an insurance contract57 protecting the attachment defendant,
runs counter to the argument for the sureties. The nature of the
proceedings against the sureties is that of collection of damages
and costs, with the secondary function of resolving differences
as to the amount or propriety of some items of damages claimed.
One obvious solution to this dilemma facing the sureties is that
of screening the attachment plaintiff's position before becoming
53 Carter v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 266 A.C.A. 886, 72 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1968).
54 Klinell v. Shirey, 223 Cal. App. 2d 239, 246, 35 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906 (1963).
55 Carter v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 266 A.C.A. 886, 888, 72 Cal. Rptr. 462, 464
(1968).
56 The issue of damages in an action for abuse of process meets the requirements
of collateral estoppel; adjudication of the identical issue, a final judgment on the
merits, and privity between the party in the prior action and the party against whom
the plea is asserted; and therefore cannot be relitigated by the surety in a subsequent
action. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
57 Klinell v. Shirey, 223 Cal. App. 2d 239, 246, 35 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906 (1963).
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surety. The net result of such a screening could well be the elimina-
tion of some excessive attachments.
The prevailing attachment defendant has his own dilemma.
In the absence of malice and want of probable cause in the bringing
of the attachment, the prevailing attachment defendant has no ac-
tion against the attachment plaintiff himself on the undertaking.
5 8
While the attachment defendant's judgment for abuse of process is
against the plaintiff, the damages and costs incident to the attach-
ment itself, other than for its excessiveness, arise by operation of
law when the defendant prevails. Since the attachment itself might
have been made with probable cause, these damages and costs may
not be sufficiently tainted with tortious conduct to be the subject
of an action directly against the plaintiff rather than the sureties.
When such damages exceed the amount of the undertaking, the
prevailing attachment defendant may find himself denied recovery
to the extent of that excess.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON BEHAVIOR AND POLICY
The archetype creditor who satisfied his entertainment needs
by turning widows and children out into the snow might have fared
poorly as plaintiff in a suit where an excessive attachment cross-
complaint was tried simultaneously with the main action. To some
extent any creditor having to defend a cross-action which, in es-
sence, amounts to an accusation of unfairness, is in danger of hav-
ing disapproval of his behavior translated into an unfavorable
verdict in the main action. One solution to this problem is the
bifurcated trial. Separate trials of counterclaims are specifically
permitted by California statute,"9 and separate trials of cross-com-
plaints are permitted under the general provision for consolidation
or severance of actions in the discretion of the court when no
prejudice to a substantial right results.6 °
The availability of an immediate cross-action, pursuant to
White Lighting,6 may cause a cross-complaint for abuse of process
to become a standard defensive measure and result in increasing
rather than decreasing the amount and complexity of litigation.
This is, however, doubtful. As a tactical device, an action for abuse
of process is a two-edged sword. A defendant can as easily hurt his
own position with an unjustified excessive attachment claim as hurt
58 Finn v. Witherbee, 126 Cal. App. 2d 45, 50, 271 P.2d 606, 610 (1954).
59 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 438 (West 1954).
60 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1048 (West 1954).
61 White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 A.C. 347, 352, 438 P.2d 345, 348, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1968).
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his adversary's position with a well-founded one. There may be
some increase in the number of such actions pursued until the
boundaries defining excessiveness become somewhat settled. The
long-range result may be that the well advised plaintiff will be cir-
cumspect in his use of the attachment process and generally avoid
the entire problem.
The attaching creditor may be in a position of not knowing
the actual extent of the debtor's interest in property seized. If all
the assets of a debtor are suspected of being heavily encumbered,
there is a practical necessity to attach a considerable gross value
in order to have sufficient net value to satisfy a judgment. A ques-
tion arises as to the result when the debtor turns out to have a
greater interest than suspected in the property attached and the
attachment is, inadvertently, excessive. The attaching plaintiff may
have a defense of sorts to impose against a cross-complaint for
abuse of process. One of the elements of abuse of process is an
ulterior purpose.2 Even though excessive attachments have long
been considered inherently to have the requisite tortious nature,63
it seems reasonable that a showing of lack of ulterior purpose,
combined with a showing that probable cause existed for the attach-
ment of a large total amount of property, and a showing of absence
of malicious conduct in the attachment activities should refute such
a conclusion. In employing such a defense, the attachment defend-
ant could almost certainly expect to have his behavior with respect
to discharging the unnecessarily levied attachments subjected to
examination. Such behavior had best be exemplary.
CONCLUSIONS
White Lighting Company v. Wolfson 4 contributes to the defi-
nition of the relationship between abuse of process and malicious
prosecution.
Classifying a cause of action resulting from an excessive attach-
ment as abuse of process is logically sound. The remaining structure
of malicious prosecution actions is strengthened by removal of those
actions which required a strained interpretation of the definition
and elements of the tort. 5
The objective of avoiding circuity and multiplicity of litigation
may be only partially met by allowing an immediate cross-claim
62 W. PROSSER, TORTS 877 (3d ed. 1964).
63 Savage v. Brewer, 33 Mass. 453, 455-56, (1835).
64 68 A.C. 347, 438 P.2d 345, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968).
65 Id. at 360, 438 P.2d at 353, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
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for an excessive attachment cause of action. In actual operation,
bifurcated trials may prove generally advisable to insure substantial
justice to all parties; hence some of the undesirable aspects of
multiplicity may continue to exist. The total time required for the
entire litigation, attachment action, and action for excessive attach-
ment, is certain to be reduced. Both actions waiting concurrently
rather than consecutively for their turn on the court calendar will
undoubtedly achieve a total time compression.
The typical excessive attachment victim, the plaintiff having
prevailed for an amount much less than claimed, finds himself in
a position not in keeping with the apparent underlying philosophy
of the statutory provision requiring attachment undertakings. 6 A
defendant prevailing against an attachment brought in good con-
science is protected by the undertaking, while the victim of a gross
abuse of the attachment procedure has no such protection unless
he prevails in the underlying action. In the interest of justice, statu-
tory provision should be made to protect a victim of a grossly
excessive attachment whether or not he prevails totally in the at-
tachment action.
Charles R. Findlay
66 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 539 (West 1954); cf. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 830
(West 1955).
